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Introduction
In Kyrgyzstan the risk of instability remains. 
The country practices genuine elections 
and power-sharing, is open to international 
engagement, and promotes basic rights such 
as free speech. In 2010 Kyrgyzstan adopted a 
new Constitution, moving away from a super-
presidential model to a system in which the 
president and the parliament share power 
more equally. Its economic performance is 
positive: the IMF assessed that the economy 
recovered quickly due to improved security 
and political stability, better-than-expected 
agricultural performance and a timely fiscal 
stimulus.1 However, it is the only ex-Soviet 
state to undergo two turbulent regime changes 
– the so called ‘Tulip-1’and ‘Tulip-2’ revolutions 
of 2005 and 2010 – and is affected by a strong 
regional split between the North and the South, 
one of the factors behind both ‘revolutions’. 
This makes Kyrgyzstan a country of paradoxes 
where it mixes positive developments with 
severe threats to its stability.
The country is split geographically into the 
North and the South, each with a distinct 
identity. The first president, Akayev (until 
2005), was from the North, and after his 
removal power shifted to the South, where 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev originated from (until 
April 2010). The current government, 
led by President Roza Otunbayeva and 
Prime Minister Almazbek Atambayev, are 
perceived as ‘northerners.’ The South is 
home to an Uzbek minority who make up 
about 15 per cent of the country’s population, 
whereas the Kyrgyz constitute 70 per cent. 
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1 IMF statement in the aftermath of its assessment mis-
sion, January 2011. IMF mission leader Nadeem Ilahi 
predicted Kyrgyz economic growth of 4-5% in 2011, in 
‘IMF praises Kyrgyz economic reforms,’ 12 February 2011, 
http://www.centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en_
GB/newsbriefs/caii/newsbriefs/2011/02/12/newsbrief-08
The Osh province in the South is 68 per cent 
Kyrgyz and 28 per cent Uzbek. Osh city, 
the southern capital, contains 47 per cent 
Kyrgyz and 44 per cent Uzbek residents. 
There are sizeable Uzbek communities in 
the Jalalabad and Batken provinces too. 
In June 2010 Kyrgyzstan was the scene of 
interethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks. Ethno-nationalism is a central 
challenge for the country. While before the 
June clashes this issue was stronger in the 
South, the events of June gave it a fresh 
impetus and served to unite the northern and 
southern Kyrgyz behind the same cause. 
This policy brief looks at where Kyrgyzstan 
now stands, between interethnic conflict and 
the forthcoming presidential elections on 
30 October 2011. Possible scenarios range 
from the establishment of the first functioning 
democracy in Central Asia to renewed internal 
strife, though the most likely outcome remains 
a continued balancing act on the verge 
of instability. State resilience to pressure 
remains low. Internal factors, e.g. regionalism 
and ethno-nationalism, could shape the 
country’s future. At the same time, the role 
the international community is becoming 
secondary, as its influence is fading. 
The first part of this brief provides an overview of the situation 
in the South, while the second part deals with the domestic and 
international inquiries into the June 2010 violence and the impact 
of the latter. In part three the developments in the run-up to the 
presidential elections are outlined including an assessment of 
the candidates likely to compete. The brief concludes with an 
analysis of the country’s prospects and what European actors 
can expect in their future interactions in Kyrgyzstan. 
The situation in the South 
On 10 June Kyrgyzstan commemorated the first anniversary of the 
2010 interethnic violence between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek commu-
nities in the South, in which about 470 people died, 1,900 people 
were injured and more than 400,000 displaced internally or fled into 
Uzbekistan. It also marks 21 years since the previous clashes, the 
dates of which (4-8 June 1990) almost coincide. The two conflicts 
had similar causes: the rise of ethno-nationalism on both sides; the 
weakening of political authority; an atmosphere of openness which 
allowed for demands to be voiced, and a sense of an historical 
opportunity to make gains, which previously seemed impossible. 
Thus, it is important to understand how central the June clashes in 
the South are to the political trajectory of Kyrgyzstan. 
One year on, the situation has somewhat stabilised. There are 
modest improvements in the spheres of human rights and law 
enforcement. Relations between the Kyrgyz majority and Uzbek 
minority remain tense, although some Uzbek-owned businesses 
operate and the rehabilitation of destroyed housing is progressing. 
Full-scale organised riots are unlikely in the short term as both com-
munities have too much at stake to allow their anger to prevail. The 
concern is that hostilities may flare up sporadically, as last year’s 
clashes broke a taboo on the use of violence. Communities are 
psychologically ready to respond with force if they feel threatened. 
Three factors are important for an understanding of the situation 
in the South. One is mutual fear. The Kyrgyz, although appearing 
triumphant on the surface, are afraid that the Uzbeks may harbour 
separatist intentions, which could undermine Kyrgyzstan’s state-
hood, may desire revenge for the harm they suffered, and may 
have support from abroad. They fear that if things flare up again, 
the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, may not be as cautious 
next time and Uzbekistan could retaliate. The Uzbeks are appre-
hensive that they are powerless vis-à-vis the police and prosecu-
tors, and defenceless against harassment by Kyrgyz youth. Secu-
rity and law-enforcement is largely in the hands of the Kyrgyz, who 
favour their ethnic kin. From their perspective, if the authority of the 
state weakens and a security gap2  opens again, the community 
would find itself in an extremely vulnerable position. 
Secondly, there is a lack of a serious reconciliation process. The 
exodus of Uzbek leaders left the community ‘beheaded.’ There 
are almost no Uzbek authority figures to participate in well-in-
tended peace-building initiatives. Reopened prosecution cases 
against exiled Uzbeks in 20113 ruled out the possibility that some 
of them would be able to return quietly. Thus, the authorities have 
few interlocutors.
Lastly, the writ of the central government over the South is weak. 
It is seen as northern and alien, and the South remains a law 
2 EUCAM Policy Brief / No. 19
2 Referring to the gap between national and international security capabilities and 
the reality of the experience of insecurity. For discussion see London School of 
Economics Global Governance Centre, Global Security, http://www2.lse.ac.uk/
globalGovernance/research/globalSecurity/home.aspx 
3 The leaders against whom prosecution cases were opened, include Kadyrjan 
Batyrov, Inomjan Abdurasulov, Abdrakhman Abdullayev, Mahammadrasul 
Abakjanov, Khaliljan Khudayberdiyev and Khavlon Mirzakhodjaev, 27 April 2011, 
http://enews.fergananews.com/article.php?id=2709 
4 In December, Osh officials inspected 109 businesses and reprimanded those which 
conducted paperwork in Russian. ‘Kyrgyzstan: Driving the Russian Language from 
Public Life’ February 17, 2011 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62916
unto itself. In Osh, power is not consolidated and different forces 
overlap: that of Mayor Melis Myrzakhmatov, whose office is not 
subordinate to the Osh provincial governor due the special status 
of Osh city, the governor, the deputy prime minister responsible for 
reconstruction in the South, and representatives of central secu-
rity agencies who report directly to Bishkek. Absence of a ‘power 
vertical’ in these volatile conditions makes it difficult for the centre 
to pursue a single course.
Stability and development in the South are undermined by inter-
communal tensions, criminality and its impact on the security sec-
tor, and by the exodus of Uzbeks and other minorities, mostly to 
Russia. Nationalism runs unabated and dominates social relations; 
those Uzbeks who wish to stay have to maintain a low profile. 
In the South the de facto policy which is being implemented in 
respect to the Russian language weakens its position in official 
use, such as the use of Russian for documents and formal cor-
respondence. This does not make it difficult for the Uzbek mi-
nority to communicate with the Kyrgyz because the languages 
are mutually intelligible, when there is enough goodwill to do so, 
but is aimed at (1) giving those Kyrgyz who went to Russian-
language schools and universities and are not comfortable with 
written Kyrgyz a message that they should master it; (2) mak-
ing the cost of doing business prohibitive for minorities, as they 
would be forced to hire additional labour to translate all docu-
ments into Kyrgyz; and (3) elevating the status of Kyrgyz over 
Russian, which serves as an expression of ‘Kyrgyz statehood,’ 
the supremacy of the ‘titular nation’ and a manifestation of eth-
no-nationalism.4 Intensive promotion of Kyrgyz, together with a 
tense and divisive atmosphere in society, pushes those who feel 
they can start a life elsewhere to leave. 
While an exodus of minorities would create a more ethnically 
homogenous society, it could undermine economic prospects. 
Before the conflict, Uzbeks had benefited from market reforms 
under Akayev which enabled small and medium enterprises to 
develop. They occupied business niches which flourished, and 
constituted the backbone of an enterprising middle class in the 
south. Now harassment, racketeering and asset raiding is forc-
ing business people to try their luck elsewhere. 
Investigations and recriminations
The international community advocated for an independent 
investigation into the June 2010 violence but was reticent 
to supply it with a mandate. The UN was slow to react to the 
Kyrgyzstan: Balancing on the Verge of Stability  Anna Matveeva                 3
crisis, and its contribution to the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission 
(KIC) was to provide guidance on its Terms of Reference. The 
OSCE, chaired by neighbouring Kazakhstan and running into 
controversy over a Police Advisory mission to Kyrgyzstan,5 did 
not want to take on another contentious task. The authorities in 
Kyrgyzstan favoured an EU mandate as was the case in 2008 
concerning the South Ossetia Tagliavini inquiry, which they 
were led to believe the Kyrgyzstan inquiry would be modelled 
on. The EU did not take it up either because the Union was 
not politically involved the way it had been in Georgia through 
previous Medvedev-Sarkozy negotiations, and it would take too 
much time to convince all 27 members states that Kyrgyzstan 
mattered.6 Eventually, the Office of War Crimes Issues of the US 
State Department came to play a major role at the KIC.
The resultant commission was chaired by Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen, 
a Finnish parliamentarian and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly 
Special Representative for Central Asia at the time, and was 
mandated by Kyrgyzstan’s president, Roza Otunbayeva. It 
consisted of seven members nominated by states and international 
organisations, but acting in their individual capacities, and was 
supported by international organisations and donor governments. 
The inquiry was an unprecedented step in Central Asia. The 
Commission released its report on 3 May in Bishkek after the 
most damaging parts were leaked by Kyrgyzstan’s news agency 
24.kg. The KIC Report7 largely follows the line taken by Human 
Rights Watch8 and International Crisis Group9 reports by stressing 
the failure of the state to protect its citizens, but goes further in 
qualifying the state’s actions as crimes against humanity.
KIC recommendations fall into two categories: accountability and 
reconciliation. The former urges the state to ‘conduct thorough, 
independent and impartial investigations into crimes, without 
reference to the ethnicity of alleged perpetrators, and ensure 
that prosecutions conform to international fair trial standards.’10 
It recommended incorporating crimes against humanity into the 
Criminal Code. Reconciliation calls for a commitment to a multiethnic 
state rather than one built around the supremacy of the ‘titular nation.’ 
KIC advocates greater inclusion, cultural recognition and state 
policies that ensure genuine equality for all citizens.
The report was met with enthusiastic support from the US State 
Department, which was one of its principle backers, who expressed 
hope that ‘the Government will take further steps to ensure 
accountability and justice,’11 and the UN Office of Human Rights. 
The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Catherine Ashton, issued a statement calling upon the authorities 
to implement the recommendations,12 and the OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly highlighted the authorities’ transparency in dealing with 
the Commission.13 Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesman noted that 
‘the conclusions seem generally balanced.’14 
The President and the government accepted some criticism, 
mainly in the field of rule of law, but rejected the qualification of 
the violence as crimes against humanity. They considered the 
Report biased, portraying one side exclusively as victims and 
the other as perpetrators.15 Bishkek’s stance was that rather 
than being a step towards reconciliation, the Report may have a 
provocative effect. Deputy Prime Minister Jantoro Sadybaldiev 
warned that the Report may instigate further interethnic clashes.16 
The response from parliamentarians was harsher: all but one 
5 On difficulties see ‘OSCE Police Mission for Kyrgyzstan Stalls,’ 1 September 2010, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61838
6 Author’s interview with a high-placed EU diplomat, September 2011.
7 ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry into the events in 
southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010’ can be found at http://www.k-ic.org/images/
stories/kic_report_english_final.pdf 
8 ‘Where is Justice?’ 16 August 2010, Human Rights Watch Report, http://www.hrw.
org/en/node/92408/section/12
9 International Crisis Group, ‘The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan,’ Asia Report no. 193, 23 
August 2010, Bishkek/ Brussels.
10 KIC Report, Recommendation no.23, p. 86.
11 ‘U.S. Statement on Release of Report of Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry Into Events of June 2010,’ Press Statement, Mark C. Toner, Acting Deputy 
Spokesman, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, 3 May, 2011, http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/162473.htm
12 ‘Statement by the High Representative Catherine Ashton, regarding the publication 
of the report of the independent international commission of inquiry into the events 
in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010,’ Brussels, 5 May 2011, A 175/1, http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/121877.pdf
13 ‘Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission releases final report,’ Copenhagen, 3 May 
2011, http://www.oscepa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1
042:kyrgyzstan-inquiry-commission-releases-final-report&catid=120:the-special-
representative-for-central-asia&Itemid=187
14 Briefing by Alexei Sazonov, Deputy Director of the Press and Information Department 
of the Russian Foreign Ministry, 13 May 2011, Moscow, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/
brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/7791b0372962344bc32578920
04573ad!OpenDocument
15 The Government’s Response was published together with the KIC Report at http://
www.k-ic.org/images/stories/kg_comments_english_final.pdf 
16 ‘Jantoro Satybaldiev: Kiljunen report may give rise to new clashes in the southern 
Kyrgyzstan’ 13 May 2011, Jalal-Abad – 24.kg news agency, by Makhinur Niyazova
17 On 5 May 1993 the Republic of Kyrgyzstan was renamed the Kyrgyz Republic.
18 For example, «киргизские бандиты» which mean ‘Kyrgyz bandits’ instead of ‘mobs’ 
in the English text.
elected representative refused to recognise the legitimacy of the 
Commission and the conclusions of the Report, which in their 
view had no status in domestic or international law, declared 
Kimmo Kiljunen persona non grata, and threatened to prosecute 
those who supplied the KIC with information. 
The Report generated a passionate domestic debate. Some 
expressed satisfaction that the government’s actions were con-
demned. Others considered that with so many actors, including 
-Uzbek leaders, having contributed to the tragic spiral of events 
over the years, it is unfair to attribute sole blame to those who 
happened to be in the job at the time. Consensus lies around 
the issues which touch upon notions of identity and culture, and 
underscore the insecurity of Kyrgyz statehood, still new and fragile, 
vis-à-vis a larger Uzbek nation with its developed material culture 
and long urban tradition. 
The idea to consider restoring the previous name ‘Republic of 
Kyrgyzstan’ instead of ‘Kyrgyz Republic’17 as less ethnically 
charged was universally rebuffed. The suggestion to allow 
the use of the Uzbek language at the local level for forms and 
documentation was presented as giving it an official status and 
vehemently discarded. The emotional response was triggered 
by what was regarded as inflammatory language, especially 
in the Russian version of the Report,18 lengthy descriptions of 
sexual violence, shocking in a socially conservative society, and 
the suggestion that Uzbeks were the traditional population of the 
South, implying that the Kyrgyz were newcomers.
4 EUCAM Policy Brief / No. 19
Such reactions reflect the nation’s feelings of being ostracised, 
which can turn dangerous, as it reinforces an anti-outsider 
sentiment and a sense of having nothing to fall back upon but 
ethnic solidarity. The Kyrgyz are now at a point where they feel 
that the suffering of their community has not been acknowledged 
and examples of cross-ethnic solidarity, when Kyrgyz people 
risked their lives to save members of the Uzbek community, 
have been ignored. The KIC Report became an outlet for 
venting frustrations. Support came only from Uzbek diaspora 
organisations, but the Uzbek community in Kyrgyzstan was 
unable to publicly express their views. 
The Kyrgyz and the international community are at odds on how 
to move forward. While Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, believes that the Report marks only the start, urging 
the government to follow up with the establishment of individual 
criminal responsibility,19 the Kyrgyz public believes that it is time 
to stop listening to foreign actors. It is unclear who would take up 
the responsibility for the mitigation of the post-KIC fallout. The 
Commission finished its work and is no longer involved in the country. 
Their recommendations have little chance to be implemented, as 
national stakeholders are not a receptive audience. Some among 
the international community question whether the KIC Report 
facilitates or complicates peace-building efforts by outsiders, 
who are no longer perceived as impartial. After the KIC hearings 
parliament set up a commission to investigate who was responsible 
for allowing the OSCE Police mission to operate in-country.
Kyrgyz politicians are disinclined to let the events rest. Three 
domestic commissions issued their reports on the June clashes. The 
first by Ombudsmen Tursunbek Akun was published in December 
2010 and attributed the blame solely to Uzbek leaders. The second, 
a National Commission set up by the President, qualified the events 
as ‘interethnic conflict.’ It admitted that the lessons of 1990 had 
not been learnt, as Uzbeks remained underrepresented at the 
higher echelons of power and in law-enforcement. The National 
Commission concluded that violence was organised in advance, 
and that several Uzbek leaders, the Bakiyevs’ clan and foreign 
religious extremists had a hand in it. It reprimanded the government 
for its lack of foresight and weak response to the crisis, and was 
bold enough to name names of existing power holders whose 
actions were recommended for further investigation. The value of 
the Report is in forward-looking strategy on interethnic relations. 
The third commission was set up in December 2010 by parliament 
at the behest of the opposition, on Ata-Jurt’s initiative, as a move 
against the politicians who had formed the Provisional Government 
(PG) during June’s events. Its focus is the establishment of 
individual responsibility and prosecution. In June 2011 the 
Commission presented three different versions as the deputies 
could not reconcile their differences. The majority report calls for the 
prosecution of most of the senior figures among civilian and security 
office-holders who dealt with the crisis at the time. Parliamentarians 
blamed the President and her ministers for allying with Uzbek 
leaders and letting them escape after the events of June.
In this debate, President Otunbayeva found herself between a rock 
and a hard place. The KIC placed the blame on the government 
she led and on her personally, only marginally taking into account 
mismanagement of interethnic relations in the Akayev and Bakiyev 
periods. At the same time, she came under heavy criticism from 
19 ‘Kyrgyzstan: UN rights chief urges follow-up action on report on ethnic violence,’ 4 
May 2011, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38272&Cr=kyrgyz&Cr1
20 In the words of the parliamentary speaker Akhmatbek Keldibekov, ‘nobody invited 
the KIC – neither people nor MPs. The president for transitional period invited the 
Commission. Let her consider the conclusions of the Commission.’ - MP suggests 
extraordinary parliamentary session to discuss Kiljunen report, 13 May 2011, 
Bishkek – 24.kg news agency, by Darya Podolskaya
21 For discussion see Erica Marat, ‘Kiljunen’s Report Blasted in Kyrgyzstan,’ Jamestown 
Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 92, 12 May, 2011, http://www.
jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37917&tx_ttnew
s%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=28a78ccc05698b43b3ddc8a0911e47fb 
domestic politicians for inviting the KIC in the first place.20 The 
KIC and Parliamentary Reports provide handy ammunition for the 
contenders in the forthcoming presidential elections.21
This individual politician’s fate represents an existential choice 
facing the whole country. With Otunbayeva’s term expiring at the 
end of the year, and a new president taking office, the question is 
how she will go down in history. Will she be remembered as the 
first female CIS head of state, who brought the country towards 
genuine elections and democracy, or will her legacy be interethnic 
violence and crimes against humanity? Will she, akin to Mikhail 
Gorbachev, be favoured more internationally than nationally?
Towards Presidential Elections
After the adoption of the new Constitution, Kyrgyzstan’s political 
system has become complex. Five parties are represented in the 
parliament, elected in October 2010, but none has a clear majority. 
After two months of horse-trading, the premiership went to the 
Social Democrats, seen as a northern party, and the position of the 
speaker, to the Ata-Jurt, who have a southern base. So far the new 
parliament has not been a model of effective governance, arguing 
about the division of power and assets. Its main preoccupation 
is the presidential election, which would decide the question of 
power, presently dispersed across various actors and institutions. 
The open character of Kyrgyzstani politics makes the run-up to the 
election more turbulent and less predictable. The race is likely to 
deepen the North-South divide. One of the front-runners is Almazbek 
Atambayev, prime minister and leader of the Social Democrats, who 
comes from the north. He may become the single candidate of the 
parties which constituted the Provisional Government during the 
June 2010 clashes. These politicians hope to avoid any prosecution 
for the 2010 violence, which victory of a southern candidate would 
surely unleash. The other northern candidate is Felix Kulov of 
Ar-Namys, a Soviet-era politician and the only one standing for 
a multiethnic society. He can count on the minority vote, as was 
the case in the parliamentary elections, and be a unifying figure 
nationally, but he does not appear to have strong support. 
The two Southern candidates are Ata-Jurt’s leader Kamchybek 
Tashiyev and the charismatic Adakhan Madumarov of Butun 
Kyrgyzstan. Both are renowned nationalists, are in tune with the 
mood of the country and enjoy widespread popularity.
Kyrgyzstan’s politics are deeply fragmented, with politicians 
maintaining their regional strongholds as power bases. The lack 
of a coherent political class and competing patronage networks 
organised on a geographical basis has stalled development. 
Political actors have few restraints and do not hesitate to bring their 
disputes into the open, as the 1 April fistfight in Parliament between 
MPs Altynbek Sulaimanov and Kamchybek Tashiyev demonstrated. 
There is a danger that electoral battles could turn violent, and lead 
to further polarisation among regional groupings if the losers refuse 
to accept defeat. The ‘Revolution’ may not be over: intra-Kyrgyz 
political struggles to achieve national consolidation still lie ahead.22 
At the same time, behind the scenes there is greater alignment 
within the political elite. Often bitter opponents in public are capable 
of negotiating and reaching compromise in private. Still, horizontal 
alliances are not formed around issues, but are products of elite 
bargains between key personalities.
Two recent popular uprisings have led experts to question 
whether this will become a ‘normal pattern’ for Kyrgyz politics. 
Kyrgyzstan remains a fragile state but is unlikely to experience a 
‘Tulip-3’ revolution. The government structures may be weak, but 
as long as they are not oppressive, people go along with them, as 
their expectations on state performance are fairly low. However, 
the institutions – the presidency, the government and Parliament 
– are too fluid to conclude with any certainty whether Kyrgyzstan 
is on the road to democracy or not. Forces of ethno-nationalism 
may well come to power through democratic means, but what 
they will do with it is unknown. 
Outlook for External Powers
In the meantime, instability in Kyrgyzstan is a concern for its 
neighbours. Cross-border incidents along the Uzbek-Kyrgyz and 
Tajik-Kyrgyz borders intensified in 2011 over transit, land use 
and the actions of border guards. None escalated into significant 
violence but relations remain tense. In the aftermath of the June 
violence the authorities in Kazakhstan, a state related to the 
Kyrgyz by kinship, were apprehensive over potential problems 
between ethnic Kazakhs and its own Uzbek minority, which is 
concentrated in the province of Southern Kazakhstan on the 
border with the Tashkent province of Uzbekistan. 
The international community’s inaction in June 2010 was not 
commendable, events moved faster than external actors could 
react. As clashes broke out, foreign officials were primarily 
concerned with the evacuation of their own citizens from the 
South23 rather than helping the government stabilise the situation. 
In its response to the KIC Report the government stressed that it 
had not received any assistance from the international community 
during the clashes, despite the main task of international 
organisations being to react to such problems. This is hard to 
argue against: Kyrgyzstan is a case of international neglect and 
unwillingness to shoulder responsibility for crisis management. In 
an event of further upheavals, would the international community 
do any better?
Thus far, Kyrgyzstan is the Central Asian country most open for 
engagement and willing to listen to external advice. Post-KIC 
fallout may turn this into a thing of the past. The current President 
is well aware of the importance of maintaining international 
cooperation, but is also conscious of the price she has to pay 
for it internally. International actors, such as the EU, European 
states, OSCE and NATO, have to be realistic that the window 
of opportunity to influence events in Kyrgyzstan may be closing. 
22 Nurlan Nabiyev, author’s interview, November 2010, Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
23 The task was hard for the EU diplomats who claimed to have no access to security 
sector agencies in Kyrgyzstan to be able to arrange such evacuation. This is ironic, 
since the EU’s largest assistance programmes BOMCA and CADAP ongoing since 
2004, are aimed at strengthening Border Guards and other security structures. 
BOMCA spent 4,346,584 euro in Kyrgyzstan in 2004 – 2010. http://bomca.eu/en/
kyrgyzstan.html 
Europe may have to accept that its advice, especially in the area 
of rule of law, is unlikely to meet with appreciative interlocutors 
after Otunbayeva leaves office. It may be more realistic to target 
sectors with Kyrgyz partners open to negotiation, rather than 
coming with an ambitious reform agenda.  
Instead, Europe is best advised to take a sober look into why 
its substantial aid to the security sector and for programmes 
aimed at conflict prevention has yielded minimal results. 
One reason is that Kyrgyzstan has a low capacity to absorb 
international aid. However, the rise of ethno-nationalism has 
also been overlooked. Before the EU and other European actors 
embark on new assistance programmes, they need to conduct 
a comprehensive and honest review of their previous efforts in 
conflict prevention, early warning and assistance to the security 
sector in Kyrgyzstan. In future, donor programmes should lead by 
example and make multiethnic recruitment a requirement in the 
projects they sponsor and proactively seek cadre from minority 
groups. As Kyrgyzstan successfully mainstreamed gender, 
it should be encouraged to do so with regards to minorities, 
starting with donors’ own operations in the country. 
Conclusion
Although a renewal of mass violence is not expected, state 
resilience remains low. Kyrgyzstan is vulnerable to cross-border 
tensions, problems with minorities and strained North-South 
relations caused by a deep regional divide. Cleavages in society 
make a return to authoritarian rule unlikely but conducting the 
business of governing the country in a democratic way is not easy 
either, given social fragmentation. One unifying factor among the 
Kyrgyz majority is the force of ethno-nationalism, reinforced by 
the inter-ethnic clashes in the South and stoked again by the KIC 
verdict. Although it strengthens solidarity among different Kyrgyz 
groups from the North and the South, this largely happens at 
the minorities’ expense, as they are losing ground. The ethno-
nationalist discourse also prevents the political class from 
calming social tensions and works to maintain an emotionally-
charged atmosphere in the run-up to the elections.
One of the reasons for the conflict was a crisis of confidence 
among the southern Kyrgyz due to insecurities regarding 
statehood. This will continue until the new president is elected 
and firmly installed in power. European actors need to help 
Kyrgyzstan to overcome these feelings of vulnerability and 
encourage a positive perspective. It is right to be critical of 
developments in Kyrgyzstan but it is also helpful to offer praise 
when it is due: Kyrgyzstan is on a difficult path to building a 
democracy, which, given the social and economic context and 
historical legacy, is not an easy task. Whatever progress has 
been made, it is worth recognition.
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Established in 2008 as a project seeking to monitor the implementation of the 
EU Strategy for Central Asia, EUCAM has grown into a knowledge hub on 
broader Europe-Central Asia relations. Specifically, the project aims to:
• Scrutinise European policies towards Central Asia, paying specific attention 
to security, development and the promotion of democratic values within the 
context of Central Asia’s position in world politics;
• Enhance knowledge of Europe’s engagement with Central Asia through top-
quality research and by raising awareness among European policy-makers 
and civil society representatives, as well as discuss European policies 
among Central Asian communities;
• Expand the network of experts and institutions from European countries and 
Central Asian states and provide a forum to debate on European-Central 
Asian relations.
Currently, the broader programme is coordinated by FRIDE, in partnership 
with the Karelian Institute and CEPS, with the support of the Open Society 
Institute and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main outputs of the 
programme are a series of policy briefs and comprehensive reports on key 
issues facing the Europe-Central Asia relationship. 
Please follow our work on www.eucentralasia.eu. If you have any comments 
or suggestions, please email us at email.eucam@gmail.com 
FRIDE is a European think tank for global action, based in Madrid, which 
provides fresh and innovative thinking on Europe’s role on the international 
stage. Our mission is to inform policy and practice in order to ensure that 
the EU plays a more effective role in supporting multilateralism, democratic 
values, security and sustainable development. We seek to engage in rigorous 
analysis of the difficult debates on democracy and human rights, Europe and 
the international system, conflict and security, and development cooperation. 
FRIDE benefits from political independence and the diversity of views and 
intellectual background of its international team. 
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels is among the most 
experienced and authoritative think tanks operating in the European Union 
today. It aims to carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to solutions 
to the challenges facing Europe today and to achieve high standards of 
academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. CEPS provides 
a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
Founded in 1971, the Karelian Institute is a unit of the Faculty of Social 
Sciences and Business Studies of the University of Eastern Finland. It engages 
in basic and applied multi-disciplinary research, supports the supervision of 
postgraduate studies and researcher training, and participates in teaching. It 
focuses mainly on three thematic priorities: Borders and Russia; Ethnicity and 
Culture; and Regional and Rural Studies.    
http://www.uef.fi/ktl/etusivu   
 www.fride.org
http://www.ceps.eu
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